Abstract. We exhibit constructions of the following two-party cryptographic protocols given only black-box access to a one-way function:
Introduction
Much of the modern work in foundations of cryptography rests on general cryptographic assumptions like the existence of one-way functions and trapdoor permutations. General assumptions provide an abstraction of the functionalities and hardness we exploit in specific assumptions such as hardness of factoring and discrete log without referring to any specific underlying algebraic structure. The expressive nature of general assumptions means that we could then derive constructions based on a large number of concrete assumptions of our choice, even ones that may not have been considered at the time of designing the constructions for natural cryptographic tasks: that is, any feasibility result may also be realized by a practical black-box construction under the same assumptions. If so, this would be a stark contrast to black-box versus non-blackbox use of the adversary's code in the proof of security in simulation-based notions of security, for which a gap has been established [21, 1] .
Upon closer examination, one notices that while the afore-mentioned black-box constructions of secure protocols do improve on the efficiency of previous non-black-box constructions as measured in terms of computational and communication complexity, most (except for [13] ) do not match the round complexity of existing non-black-box constructions. Indeed, there are several fundamental constant-round two-party cryptographic tasks, notably zero-knowledge arguments for NP for which we do know how to realize via non-black-box usage of a one-way function [17] , but existing black-box constructions either require a super-constant number of rounds or stronger assumptions [22, 20] . This raises the following intriguing question:
Is there an inherent trade-off between round complexity and either efficiency or computational assumptions in realizing these two-party cryptographic tasks?
Put differently, if we require a constant-round zero-knowledge argument system, must we necessarily turn to a non-black-box construction (thereby incurring a loss in efficiency) or use collision-resistant hash functions (a stronger assumption)? Interestingly, the Feige-Shamir zero-knowledge arguments [17] constitute one of the earliest examples of non-black-box constructions; the same work also presents a non-black-box construction of constant-round trapdoor commitments from one-way functions, for which there is again a gap with respect to existing black-box constructions. Other related tasks with a similar gap include parallel coin-tossing from one-way functions, and secure two-party computation from semi-honest oblivious transfer. In each of these cases, constant-round nonblack-box constructions are known [34, 44, 22] , whereas existing black-box constructions either additionally assuming collision-resistant hash functions or constant-round statistically hiding commitments [20, 14, 34, 35] (which we know cannot be realized via black-box access to a one-way function [26, 43] 3 ) or by considering protocols with super-constant number of rounds. We summarize these prior results in Figure 1 . Our results. In this work, we answer the afore-mentioned question negatively: we present black-box constructions of constant-round zero-knowledge arguments for NP and several other two-party functionalities under the minimal assumption of one-way functions:
Theorem 1 (informal). There exist black-box constructions of constant-round zero-knowledge arguments (of knowledge) for NP, constant-round trapdoor commitments and constant-round parallel coin-tossing, starting from any oneway function.
We stress that reducing the computational assumptions for these cryptographic protocols from collision-resistant hash functions to one-way functions is important also in practice; recent attacks on the popular MD4, MD5 and SHA1 hash functions demonstrate that achieving collision-resistance in the heuristic sense is much harder than achieving one-way'ness. The above constructions may be modified to achieve security against adaptive corruptions in the stand-alone model (c.f. [5] ) while maintaining constant round complexity. This improves on the early work of Beaver [2] , who provided constructions assuming hardness of factoring. The idea is to have the receiver in the commitment scheme from [14] (which we observe to be adaptively secure) commit to its challenge using our trapdoor commitment scheme.
Secure two-party computation.
A series of recent work [29, 35, 25, 10, 30] (building on [31] ) provided a black-box construction of secure two-party protocols starting from semi-honest oblivious transfer. The resulting protocol has constant round complexity assuming a constant-round parallel coin-tossing protocol. The following result then follows as an immediate corollary of our coin-tossing protocol: This result also extends to any constant number of parties, while preserving constant round complexity. We point out that in concurrent work, Choi et al. [10] established an analogous statement for adaptive corruptions, using as a building block our trapdoor commitment schemes tolerating adaptive corruptions.
Additional constructions. Combining our techniques with previous work, we also obtain black-box constructions of concurrent zero-knowledge arguments and non-malleable commitments from one-way functions: The concurrent zero-knowledge argument system follows readily from modifying the challenge-response preamble in our stand-alone zero-knowledge argument system in the manner of [39, 37] . The non-malleable commitment scheme requires substantially more work, combining ideas from our standalone zero-knowledge argument system, an encoding scheme from [9] along the messaging scheduling and analysis from [15, 33] .
Overview of our constructions
We begin with our overview of our constant-round zero-knowledge arguments and trapdoor commitment schemes, which are obtained by applying a compiler to challenge-response protocols with a certain structure.
Challenge-response protocol. Consider a 3-round challenge-response protocol, say between a prover and a verifier with possibly a common input, with the following structure: In the first round, the prover commits to values v 1 , . . . , v k (bit by bit, in parallel). The verifier responds with a random challenge e ∈ {0, 1} k , and the prover responds by opening to some subset of bits in each value v 1 , . . . , v k . Then verifier then decides whether to accept or reject.
SPECIAL SOUNDNESS: For every message in the first round, there exists at most one "easy challenge"ẽ that allows the prover to cheat. For a language, cheating means convincing the verifier to accept a NO instance; for a commitment scheme, cheating means generating an accepting commit phase transcript that can be opened to two different values. Moreover, we require that the "easy challenge" is efficiently recoverable in the following sense: there is an efficient procedure that given the values v 1 , . . . , v k (along with the common input), outputs a stringẽ such that if an easy challenge exists, it must equalẽ.
LOOK-AHEAD SIMULATION: Roughly speaking, this condition says simulation is easy if we can look ahead and obtain the verifier's challenge e. For a language, this condition stipulates that the protocol is special honest-verifier zero-knowledge [11] : we require that the simulator on input any fixed verifier's challenge e generates an "honest-looking" transcript.
Here, honest-looking means computationally indistinguishable from an honest prover-verifier interaction wherein the verifier always sends e. For a commitment scheme, this condition stipulates that there exists a simulator that on input any fixed verifier's challenge e generates an "honest-looking" transcript of the commit phase that can be later opened to any value v. Here, honest-looking means computationally indistinguishable from an honest commitment and opening to the value v wherein the verifier always sends e in the commit phase.
The compiler. We have the verifier commits to its challenge e in advance before running the challenge-response protocol. Indeed, this approach was adopted in [20, 18] for zero knowledge, and in [14] for trapdoor commitments. The difficulty is that we do not know how to guarantee soundness as there could be a malleability attack (specifically, we do not know how to rule out the possibility that after seeing the verifier's commitment to e, the cheating prover could send some carefully crafted commitments that can be open to a valid accepting response once the verifier opens the commitment to e). This problem can be circumvented in one of three ways:
-Have the verifier commit using a perfectly hiding commitment scheme and the prover use a statistically binding commitment scheme [20, 14] . -Have the verifier commit using a trapdoor commitment scheme and the prover use a statistically binding commitment scheme (implicit in [34, 39, 42, 24] 4 ).
-Have both the prover and verifier commit using a computationally hiding commitment scheme, but have the prover prove that it "knows" the values underlying its commitments (e.g., by using a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge) before the verifier opens the commitment to its challenge [18, Sec 4.9.2.2].
We adopt the third approach in this paper. Specifically, we use an extractable commitment scheme, which is informally a commitment scheme with a proof of knowledge property. Such a commitment scheme can be constructed via blackbox access to any commitment scheme using cut-and-choose techniques [39, 15] . Note that the first approach cannot work in our setting because there is no black-box construction of constant-round perfectly hiding commitment schemes from one-way functions [26] , whereas the second requires a functionality that we are trying to construct.
Towards trapdoor commitments & parallel coin-tossing. For zero-knowledge arguments, Blum's challenge-response protocol for the NP-complete problem Graph Hamiltonicity [4] suffices. On the other hand, for trapdoor commitments, we need to design a new challenge-response protocol because we do not know how to efficiently recover the easy challenge in the [14] protocol. Next, we show how to derive an extractable trapdoor commitment scheme starting from any trapdoor commitment scheme (such as ours), and from there, we obtain a constant-round parallel coin-tossing protocol from the works of [3, 8] .
Preliminaries
We will use 1 k to denote the security parameter. We refer the reader to [18] for definitions of various cryptographic notions, such as zero knowledge.
Commitment schemes. Recall that a commitment scheme Com is a 2-party protocol between a sender C and a receiver R. In this paper, we always refer to computationally hiding commitment schemes. The binding property however, may be either statistical or computational. A commitment scheme has a commit phase and an open phase; we only consider commitment schemes where the open phase consists of a single message from the sender to the receiver. We know that there is a black-box construction of a 2-round statistically binding commitment scheme from any one-way function [36, 27] .
knowledge proof that the value in the commitment is e; the verifier is effectively using a trapdoor commitment.
Trapdoor commitment schemes. Let (C, R) be a (computationally hiding) commitment scheme. We say that (C, R) is a trapdoor commitment scheme if there exists an expected polynomial-time probabilistic oracle machine S = (S 1 , S 2 ) such that for any PPT R * and all v ∈ {0, 1} n , the output (τ, w) of the following experiments are computationally indistinguishable:
-an honest sender C interacts with R * to commit to v, and then opens the commitment: τ is the view of R * in the commit phase, and w is the message C sends in the open phase. -the simulator S generates a simulated view τ for the commit phase, and then opens the commitment to v in the open phase: formally,
Extractable commitment schemes. Let (C, R) be a statistically binding commitment scheme. We say that (C, R) is an extractable commitment scheme if there exists an expected polynomial-time probabilistic oracle machine (the extractor) E that given oracle access to any PPT cheating sender C * outputs a pair (τ, σ * ) such that:
-(simulation) τ is identically distributed to the view of C * at the end of interacting with an honest receiver R in commit phase. -(extraction) the probability that τ is accepting and σ * = ⊥ is negligible.
-(binding) if σ * ̸ = ⊥, then it is statistically impossible to open τ to any value other than σ * .
We will also consider extractable commitment schemes that are computationally binding; the definition is as above, except if σ * ̸ = ⊥, we only require that it is computationally infeasible to open τ to any value other than σ * .
4 Extractable commitment schemes.
The basic construction. The following protocol used in the works of [15, 39, 41] (also [31] ) yields an extractable commitment scheme, starting from any commitment scheme Com:
COMMIT PHASE.
-The sender commits (using Com) to k pairs of strings -The sender sends σ and opens the commitments to all k pairs of strings.
-The receiver checks that all the openings are valid, and also that σ
We sketch the proof (implicit in [15, 39, 41] ) that ExtCom is an extractable commitment scheme.
Computationally hiding. The proof proceeds by a hybrid argument. Fix a cheating receiver, σ, σ ′ and suppose we want to show that ExtCom(σ) and ExtCom(σ ′ ) are computationally indistinguishable. In the i'th hybrid distribution, the first i pairs of strings are random shares of σ and the last k − i pairs of strings are random shares of σ ′ . Suppose we have a distinguisher for the i'th and i + 1'th hybrids. If the distribution of the bit e i is noticeably biased, then we can break the hiding property of the underlying commitment Com right away. Otherwise, we can guess e i with probability roughly 1/2 and obtain a distinguisher for Com(σ ⊕ η i ) and Com(σ ′ ⊕ η i ).
Extractable. We start with the easier case where Com is statistically binding, upon which ExtCom is also statistically binding. Fix a cheating sender C * . We construct the extractor E as follows: 1. First, simulate an execution of C * by internally emulating an honest receiver R to obtain a transcript τ of the commit phase. If τ is rejecting, then output (τ, ⊥) and halt. 2. If τ is accepting with some challenge e, then keep rewinding C * with random challenges until we receive another accepting response from C * with some challenge e ′ . If e = e ′ , then output (τ, ⊥) and halt. Otherwise, extract a value σ * from the C * 's responses to distinct challenges e, e ′ (by combining the appropriate shares), and output (τ, σ * ). Now, suppose the probability over e that we obtain an accepting transcript τ is p. Then, the expected number of queries E makes to C * is (1−p)+p· 1 p ≤ 2. Also, the failure probability, i.e., the probability that τ is accepting and e = e ′ is at most p ·
We can still use the same extractor E in the case where Com is computationally binding. Now, if there is a cheating sender that can open the commitment in τ to a different value from σ * , then we can combine this with the opening to σ * obtained by E to derive an efficient adversary that breaks the binding property of Com.
The parallel variant. For our compiler, we will actually need an extractable commitment scheme to a string σ for which we can open any subset of the bits in σ without compromising the security (i.e. hiding) of the remaining bits. We may obtain such a scheme PExtCom by running ExtCom to commit to each bit of σ in parallel. That PExtCom is hiding follows from the more general fact that the hiding property of commitment schemes is preserved under parallel composition. To show that PExtCom is extractable, we may use the same extractor E as before, except for a modification in step 2. Note that the receiver's challenge in PExtCom is a k-tuple of m-bit strings, which again we denote by e ∈ ({0, 1} m ) k . Once we obtain responses to two challenges e, e ′ in
Step 2, we proceed as follows: if e ′ agrees with e in any of the k components, we output (τ, ⊥) and halt. Otherwise, we will be able to extract each of the m bits in the m parallel executions of ExtCom. As before, the expected number of queries E makes to C * is at most 2. The failure probability in this case is now at most m · 2 −k .
Zero-knowledge arguments for NP
Look-ahead zero-knowledge proof system. We use as our look-ahead zeroknowledge proof system the parallel repetition variant of Blum's Hamiltonicity protocol [4] , which we already know to be special honest-verifier zeroknowledge.
HAMILTONICITY PROTOCOL Π HAM .
-Common input: a graph G on n vertices. We just need to verify that the easy challenge is efficiently recoverable: The zero-knowledge argument system. The zero-knowledge protocol is as follows:
1. The verifier picks a random e ∈ {0, 1} k and commits to e using Com, a statistically-binding commitment scheme. The analysis. Completeness is straight-forward.
Computational soundness. Suppose there exists a cheating prover P * (WLOG deterministic) that convinces the verifier to accept a non-Hamiltonian graph G with probability ϵ = 1/ poly(k). Intuitively this means that P * on input Com(e) predicts e with probability roughly ϵ ≫ 2 −k , which must contradict the hiding property of Com. More formally, fix the graph G, and we know that with probability ϵ/2 over e, P * succeeds with probability ϵ/2. Let Γ denote the set of such challenges e, so |Γ| ≥ ϵ 2 · 2 k , and consider the procedure A that on input a commitment Com(e): 
By using a non-uniform reduction, we may WLOG assume that 0 k ∈ Γ. Now, the sets of strings Γ ′ in the output of A(Com(0 k )) that occurs with probability at least ϵ 8 is at most 8 ϵ . Since |Γ ′ | < |Γ|, there must exist a string, say 1 k , that lies in Γ but outside Γ ′ . Now,
This yields a distinguisher for Com(0 k ) and Com(1 k ), which contradicts the hiding property of Com.
Zero-knowledge. The zero-knowledge simulator is virtually identically to that in the Goldreich-Kahan protocol [20] . Roughly speaking, upon receiving the verifier's commitment to e, the prover sends the cheating verifier V * dummy commitments. If the verifier aborts, we are basically done. Otherwise, we learn the challenge e and then we could use the honest-verifier zero-knowledge simulator to complete the simulation. As in [20] , we will need to estimate the probability that V * aborts on dummy commitments.
Argument of knowledge.
We may obtain a zero-knowledge argument of knowledge for NP by instantiating the Feige-Shamir protocol [17] with the trapdoor commitment scheme, which we present in the next section.
Trapdoor commitments
We construct a "look-ahead trapdoor commitment". This is a statistically binding commitment scheme wherein the commit phase comprises a 3-round challenge-response protocol. In addition, the scheme will be "look-ahead trapdoor" in the following sense: if we fix the receiver's challenge in the challenge-response phase, then we may generate a simulated transcript for the commit phase which we may later open to both a 0 and a 1. Moreover, the transcript together with either bit b is computationally indistinguishable from a legitimate commitment to b followed by an opening to b. We note similar constructions appear in [32, 31] . In addition, we stress that we cannot use the challenge-response protocol in [14] because we do not know how to efficient compute the easy challenge in that protocol. 6 Look-ahead trapdoor bit commitment. To commit to a bit σ. Again, we fix some statistically binding commitment scheme Com.
Roughly speaking, easy challenges in [14] are the first-round messages in Naor's commitment scheme [36] that allow a computationally unbounded sender to cheat, i.e. strings of the form -The sender sends σ. In addition, it chooses a random γ ∈ {0, 1}, sends γ, opens the commitments to v
, either the top rows or the bottom rows of all the matrices).
-The receiver checks that all the openings are valid, and also that σ = v
Analysis. It is straight-forward to show that the commitment scheme is computationally hiding.
Special soundness. Suppose we have a cheating sender that generates a transcript for the commit phase that can be successfully open to both a 0 and a 1. It must be the case that every matrix v i contains at least one column with two unequal bits; call that columnẽ i . Then, the cheating sender will get caught in the commit phase unless e =ẽ = (ẽ 1 , . . . ,ẽ k ). Moreover, given v 1 , . . . , v k it is easy to computeẽ.
Look-ahead trapdoor. We construct a simulator as follows: -Given the challenge e, pick a random β ∈ {0, 1}, and prepare the matrices v i as follows:
where η i is a random bit. When the receiver sends e, open the commitments to v The trapdoor bit commitment scheme. The construction and the analysis is completely analogous to the zero-knowledge protocol. The verifier begins by committing to a random challenge e ∈ {0, 1} k using a statistically-binding commitment Com, and then we proceed according to the look-ahead scheme except the prover commits using ExtCom. Completeness is again straight-forward. Establishing computational binding is analogous to establishing computational soundness for the zero-knowledge protocol; we transform any cheating sender a distinguisher for Com by arguing that it must on input Com(e) predict e with noticeable probability. Trapdoor simulation is again based on the GoldreichKahan simulation strategy [20] .
Extension to multiple bits. We claim that by running the trapdoor bit commitment scheme in parallel, we obtain a trapdoor commitment scheme for multiple bits, with the additional property that we can open the commitment to any subset of the bits without compromising the security of the remaining bits. We know that parallel repetition preserves the hiding and binding properties of commitment schemes. To see that the parallel version is still trapdoor, observe that we may still use the Goldreich-Kahan simulation strategy and that the lookahead simulation property is preserved under parallel repetition.
Parallel coin-tossing
We present a constant-round parallel coin-tossing protocol in this section. Using the composition theorem in [6] and the results of [3, 8] , it is sufficient to implement the ideal string commitment functionality F Com (shown in Fig 2) with stand-alone security a la [22, 5, 19] in constant rounds. Moreover, by the results of [7] , it suffices to construct a constant-round extractable trapdoor commitment scheme.
Extractable trapdoor commitment scheme. We provide a general construction of an extractable trapdoor commitment scheme ExtTDCom starting from any trapdoor commitment scheme TDCom: simply instantiate the protocol ExtCom with the trapdoor commitment scheme TDCom. Specifically, the sender in ExtTDCom on input a string σ ∈ {0, 1} m , commits to k pairs of strings The coin-tossing protocol. For self-containment, we present the coin-tossing protocol based directly on ExtTDCom. The high level proof strategy is as follows.
-If Party 1 is corrupted, we will use the extractor for ExtTDCom to extract s 1 and then set s 2 = s 1 ⊕ s (where s is the string chosen by the trusted party). -If Party 2 is corrupted, we will use the trapdoor commitment property so that upon receiving s 2 from Party 2, the simulator can open the commitment to s 1 = s ⊕ s 2 .
Non-malleable commitments
We begin by describing a commitment scheme satisfying some strong notions of extractability and hiding, based on an encoding scheme from [9] .
2. The sender picks random α 1 , . . . , α k ∈ GF(2 n ) and set s j = p(j), j ∈ [10k] where p(x) = v + α 1 x + . . . + α k x k . The sender then commits to (s 1 , . . . , s 10k ) a total of 2ℓ times using PExtCom sequentially. 3. The receiver opens the commitment to S. 4. The sender opens the 2ℓ commitments to the value s j for all j ∈ S. 5. The receiver checks that for each j ∈ S, the 2ℓ commitments to s j open to the same value. We sketch the properties satisfied by this commitment scheme, and defer the analysis to the full version of this paper.
Extractability. There exists expected polynomial-time probabilistic oracle machines E 1 , E 2 , . . . , E 2ℓ such that for all i = 1, 2, . . . , 2ℓ, the machine E i given oracle access to any PPT cheating sender C * outputs a pair (τ, σ * ) such that -(simulation) τ is identically distributed to the view of C * at the end of interacting with an honest receiver R in commit phase. -(strong extraction) the pair (τ, σ * ) is computationally indistinguishable from the view of C * at the end of interacting with an honest receiver R in commit phase, together with the committed value implicitly specified by the view.
